National Society and Imperatives of Modern Security by Darchiashvili, David
102
David Darchiashvili
National Society and Imperatives of Modern Security 
1. Why nation
We live in such collective communities that are grouped by national 
characteristic, or more precisely, by national label. Thus, we have a national 
identity at least by passport, language or the manner of paying or evading tax-
es, even if we did not pay or were not able to pay attention to it. “Nationality 
makes people feel good”, says Leah Greenfeld, a world-renowned researcher 
of nationalism1. This phrase pushes us towards psychology and social psychol-
ogy. Referring to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, the belongingness to a nation 
can be discerned on the third and fourth levels of this hierarchy, in connec-
tion with belonging and self-esteem needs. The belongingness to the nation, 
however, is no less important to meet the needs characteristic for the fifth, 
self-actualization level, which are, in essence, cognitive needs. Moreover, an 
incentive for the belongingness to a nation can be found on the second level, 
i.e. in the needs for security.2 
The benefit or the necessity of a democratic political system for a social 
development and the satisfaction of an individual’s physiological, psychologi-
cal or cognitive needs is now acknowledged worldwide. It is also recognized 
that a modern democracy and nationalism are hard to be imagined and im-
plemented separately. As Jean Daniel noted, “the search of democracy could have 
preceded the creation of modern nations, but in essence, they are twin concepts: it is 
impossible to separate territorial nation and popular sovereignty”3.  Building a vi-
able state requires not only agreed rules of political game but also shared val-
ues, common dreams and desires. Democracy alone, without nationalism, fails 
to explain why it should be built autonomously on any territory, why states 
should not disintegrate or integrate through, say, regularly held referendums.
A sense of national identity is linked with culture. Culture, however, 
is nothing else but a set of existing “patterns” for transmitting and obtain-
ing experience. People act in accordance with their “own definitions of sit-
uation” and with own “rules” that are appropriate to these situations. These 
rules, i.e. culture, are not universal. As Harold Scheffer notes, the most ‘irra-
tional’ or ‘illogical’ behavior of the so-called primitive peoples is nothing else 
but a behavior which differs from the behavior we expect to be appropriate 
in a concrete situation. This difference emerges from the reality that par-
ticipants in the behavior evaluate and understand the situation in different 
103
ways.4 Culture, of course, is not a national phenomenon alone. There could 
be more than one culture and counterculture within the institutionally and 
legally organized “nation”. Though, it is also clear that an overwhelming ma-
jority of researchers in nationalism link nation, people, to the formation of a 
mass, uniform culture which is formulated by ideologists and spread through 
education system and mass media. One may say that mass media has turned 
culture into a global, post-national phenomenon but this opinion seems ex-
aggerated because the world still remains divided into nations.
John Locke reckoned that a state is not created on the basis of prag-
matic estimations alone and that a sense of “justice”, or the drive towards it, 
is no less important. He believed that morality does not stem from the desire 
to obtain personal benefit but vice versa5. However “justice” and “morality” 
are historical and cultural categories acquired and comprehended by various 
societies in different ways. Therefore, a state or a democracy is tied to culture 
the optimal and most enduring form of which has always been a nation-state.
In order to implement a collective political project, most of the popu-
lation of a territory, named country, should form a pragmatic interest of its 
members and social groups. World outlook and cultural features and ties 
should also be taken into account. A sense of collective identity is an essen-
tial aspect and is one of the most important variables for the functioning of 
any political system
2. Since when nation 
It is impossible to scientifically deny today that a nation is a histor-
ical category, i.e., it did not always exist and may disappear. Moreover, it 
would not or could not have been created concurrently across the world. 
Leah Greenfeld attributes great importance in the creation of a nation to 
such socio-psychological state as existential envy. “Ressentiment”, the term 
introduced by Nietzsche, which is used by the researcher to describe this 
state, stems, on the one hand, from the alienation of a certain group of people 
from an existing socio-political or economic order, anomie, and on the other 
hand, from the jealousy towards other, a more advanced society6. Greenfeld 
considers the actualization of the Russian national idea to be an outcome of 
the 18th century and links it to the competition and confrontation of some 
Russian aristocracy with European societies. 
 Anthony Smith echoes Greenfeld’s assertions in his own way when 
concluding that “ethnies”7 used to “awaken”, i.e., to develop their national 
self-consciousness in copying from each other8.
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It should be consequently assumed that the exact time of the formation 
of a nation cannot be established - in separate cases, it could have happened 
in various ways and in different epochs. Hence, the job of social scientists and 
historians - the exploration of concrete circumstances of the birth of nations 
and individual cultures - becomes crucial. However, dominating modern or 
postmodern social theories, ruling out the so-called primordialism, i.e. the 
existence of nations since early human history, place an emphasis on specific 
socio-economic or cultural-political conditions and regard a nation as well as 
nationalism to be an outcome of the modernization of societies, the demoli-
tion of agrarian or feudal hierarchies. 
According to the theories, to be briefly discussed later in this paper, the 
term nation is the old one but its meaning was absolutely different before, at 
least, 16th century9. The point is that this Latin term, meaning “birth” (natio 
- birth; being born), was used in medieval ages to describe mainly communi-
ties of university professors or students. There was hardly a mention of rep-
resentatives of contemporary European nations at those times (for example, 
Prague University, in 1349, mentions Bohemian, Bavarian, Saxon and vari-
ous Polish nations)10, even more so of their common political self-identity or 
political project which is the basic foundation of nationalism. 
Nevertheless, names and boundaries of nations can change, which 
means that the Saxon self-identity could eventually mix up with that of Ger-
man. Besides, in a number of classical or early medieval texts this term has 
a more modern, political connotation. In 44 BC, for example, Cicero wrote 
to Mark Antony: “All races are able to bear enslavement, but our community 
cannot”11. Holy Roman Empire’s legate at the court of Byzantine Emperor 
Nicephorus II tied the language and origin of population to a political be-
longingness when, in 968, while confronting Emperor, declared: “The land...
which you say belongs to your empire belongs, as the nationality and lan-
guage of the people proves, to the kingdom of Italy”12. Similar correlations of 
culture, nation, language and politics can be observed in Georgian historical 
sources of earlier periods than any discussion on modern Georgian nation 
and nationalism could have taken place. The best example of this is an ex-
cerpt from a literary work by the 10th century hagiographer, Ioane Merchule, 
about Kartli as an entire country where the liturgy is conducted in Georgian.
These examples, I think, illustrate that a social identity based upon cul-
tural layers was in the foundation of the state-building for centuries. But no 
agreement is reached within the scope of social science on whether this iden-
tity was national, in the modern sense of this word, or how different, in quali-
tative terms, modern and pre-modern political identities are. 
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3. What is the basis a nation is created on
At the turn of 19th and 20th centuries, nationalists and Marxists believed 
that a modern nation was a historically formed stable unity built on the basis 
of common language, shared territory, common economic activity and psy-
chological and cultural peculiarities. But a nation, for the overwhelming ma-
jority of modern social scientists, is not a community sharing only common 
language and common ancestors or the belief in having common ancestors. 
Nor is it limited to common political sympathies and antipathies of large so-
cial communities.
Modern studies in nationalism carried out mainly by representatives of 
a diverse so-called modernist school somewhat reflect post-modern views as 
well. By reinterpreting some provisions of Marxism, this school has been en-
gaged in identifying the phases in the formation of a nation and the agents 
of these phases. It also tries to identify the degree of inconsistency between 
the structure and values of industrial and pre-industrial societies. The conclu-
sion, despite its various interpretations, is that a nation is not a mere historical 
construct but also rather an artificial one and its formation was prompted by 
individual or group frustrations of intellectuals, marginalized from traditional 
elites, or/and by the desire of post-feudal and post-imperial state agents to 
create a uniform, culturally homogenous mass of subordinates. To this end, 
nation-builders employed folklore, myths, created history, as the only way to 
form a nation was to generate a sense of super-class solidarity among ordi-
nary people by using a common past (with the achievements or failures of 
common ancestors).  
At the same time, modernists study a beneficial influence of imperson-
al, economic and technological forces upon the above mentioned processes. 
The point is that the modernization was not only and not as much an intel-
lectual process as those forms of trade, war, communication that were incom-
patible with a traditional, class lifestyle and required from people a new soci-
ety - enhanced and horizontal solidarity. Social origin was being replaced by 
individual professionalism, but the social stability and policy needed not an 
anarchic unity of atomized individuals or professional craftsmen but a new 
solidarity and homogeneity, accordingly, the nation.
As mentioned above, nationalism is linked with democracy, but not 
every kind of nationalism is associated with the protection of human rights. 
According to Greenfield, there are, on the one hand, individualistic and col-
lectivistic nations and on the other hand, some of them are civic and some 
ethnic. Greenfield believes that individualistic and civic nations give rise to 
liberal-democratic societies whereas collectivistic and ethnic nations - to vari-
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ous forms of authoritarianism13. Anyway, if nationalism is, first of all, the con-
dition causing the break up of a class society, or associated with this break-up, 
and grouping people by national features, it is impossible that this process 
does not equip individuals, named as citizens of nation-state, with an imagi-
native or real political power. What definitely distinguishes a political system 
of the feudal epoch from that of the modern epoch is the democratic idea of 
popular sovereignty.
Let me quote some examples of modernists’ reasoning: Ernest Gellner 
reckons that the industrialization brings about literacy and hence, the spread 
of education across the entire population as, given the new nature of work 
demands, each inhabitant of a political entity tends to become a literate clerk. 
In a pre-modernist society nationalism could not have existed because the 
elite saw no need in spreading culture among lower strata of producers. Under 
market economy, however, it is impossible to achieve full homogeneity and a 
new spiral of confrontation between rich and poor starts (a nationalistic pro-
paganda could be an additional argument for the desire to mitigate it - D.D.). 
This confrontation can, however, support and further expand nationalism if 
the poor and the rich in a modernizing pre-national or multiethnic national 
political system belong to different linguistic groups. 
Michael Mann and Anthony Giddens reckon that a nation is formed 
by a centralized state with its bureaucracy, striving to make the government 
uniform, and with associated large institutions (parliaments, schools, labor 
markets, courts and widespread literature). A modernist camp, somewhat 
engaged in a postmodernist discourse, with Benedict Anderson’s “Imagined 
Communities” being the most famous piece of work, put an emphasis on a 
qualitative difference between pre-modern and modern discourse and imagi-
nation skills. For Anderson a nation is such a unity of emotion, will, imagina-
tion and perception, who gets familiar with literature printed in a vernacular, 
measures time by clock and calendar and whose representatives escape from 
personal oblivion, death, through generating a sense of belongingness to an 
“imagined” national community.
Eric Hobsbawm sees the formation of nations as a deliberate action by 
“elite craftsmen” and attributes an insignificant importance to the quality or 
authenticity of pre-national, ethnic cultural material in this process. Inciden-
tally, Gellner stated the same, though in his own way, seeing the importance 
of the use of fragments of old culture in the formation of a modern nation 
and even considering it unnecessary.14
Schematically, modernists view the genesis of a nation as the imagina-
tion of a nation by frustrated intellectuals or ambitious leaders under the in-
fluence of invisible modernizing forces. In this case, pre-modern institutions 
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or cultures are of a secondary importance. Following Gellner’s definition, na-
tionalistic ideology creates nations and not the other way round.
Some contradictions are, however, characteristic for this school of 
thought. Hobsbawm, for example, thinks that proto-national communities 
can also be discovered in pre-modern periods and sees the role of the memory 
of earlier political and cultural institutions played in the creation of a modern 
mass nationalism in England, France, Russia and Serbia.
Anthony Smith, known as a representative of ethnosymbolism, a school 
of scholars in nationalism, sees a completely different relation between pre-
modern and modern epochs. He does not deny that nation and nationalism 
are the products of the modern epoch and, in essence, acknowledges the righ-
teousness of many of the above quoted arguments. But for him, the national-
ism is directly linked to a sense of solidarity and ethnic identification existing 
beyond centuries. Smith introduces the term ethnie to describe such cultural 
groups which possessed collective identities for centuries and represented the 
basis for modern nations. According to his definition, ethnie is a named pop-
ulation sharing a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared 
historical memories, one or more differencing elements of common culture, 
an association with a specific homeland and a sense of solidarity for signifi-
cant sectors of the population. As regards the nation, it is defined as a named 
population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memo-
ries, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and 
duties for its members. Smith believes that ethnie can also be politically or-
ganized and numerous. What distinguishes nation is a type of mass public 
culture, common economy and common legal rights and duties15.
Smith also reckons that such institutions, the carriers of ethnic iden-
tity and culture in pre-modern epochs, as linguistic codes, rituals, homelands 
or markets and armies were inclusive enough not to imagine that the only 
means of population’s homogenization was printed book or bureaucracy that 
is characteristic for modernism alone.
As a conclusion it could be said that nationalism is not only and not 
as much a rational state of the mind as emotional. Otherwise, people would 
not have risked their wellbeing for national interests. Despite very interest-
ing and widely spread studies of modernists, nationalism continues to be a 
fundamental driving force of international and domestic political processes. 
Although it could be a fiction invented by individual intellectuals where his-
torical annals say nothing about its roots, this “fiction” still stirs up a sense of 
solidarity in millions of people. To prove or foster the value of this solidarity 
people, even in the most civic and individualistic nation, are sincerely inclined 
to search roots of nationalism in pre-modern stages. As Ghia Nodia states, 
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“these two types of nationalisms (civic and ethnic - D.D.) are ideal ones. Any real 
instance of nationalism contains the elements of both types”16. 
Nation and nationalism is a risky unity and ideology because people, 
under national flags, tend to ignore their own as well as others lives. However, 
an international system is arranged in such a way and an individual’s basic re-
quirements build up such a hierarchy that a nation-state still remains to be an 
irreplaceable institution for ensuring  individual as well as collective security.
4. Nation and security
As the key function of a nation-state is to define and protect national 
interests, the security policy with its implementing sector is core to the state. 
This maxim has been well understood by politicians and political theorists 
since, at least, 16-17th centuries. Many historians and political scientists be-
lieve that Cardinal Richelieu pursued this principle when, being a catholic 
clergyman himself, made France fight in support of Protestants. Nicollo Ma-
chiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, actually, advocated for national 
interests and the state as of the mechanism for ensuring the security. These 
scholars are of special interest to the researchers of the formation of ethnic-
national self-identity, i.e. the origins of nationalism.17
Hobbes advocates for the absolute power of authority and, using a 
modern security discourse, regards even religion as a sphere to be controlled 
by the national security institutions18. John Locke, on the other hand, thinks 
that no religion shall be subject to any prohibition by the state unless it calls 
for or instigates violence19. The latter thesis is quite close in its nature to a 
modern discourse on human rights as well as to principles of individual or 
human security having developed along with and in parallel to the national 
security20.
Thus, the security - both individual and national - depends on the ex-
istence and efficiency of a state. Citizens are united by the needs for esteem 
and self-realization as well as the desire to support each other in the fight for 
survival. That means that the abovementioned Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 
cannot be satisfied individually and therefore, as political theorists say, a so-
cial contract is formed and the state created. To achieve this, according to the 
logic of psychology or political theory, a sense of nationalism - be it collec-
tivistic-ethnic or individualistic-civic - is needed. Should nationalism be dis-
carded neither the state nor the security would remain. Everything else - the 
drive towards super-national unity and security institutions, or the shift of 
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the center of gravity of politeia onto sub-national frames - is imperfect, or/
and remains the sphere of imagination. 
The question of how a modern nation differs from old communities and 
what distinguishes one from the other is the key to modern or post-modern 
constructivist sociological/anthropological theories on nation and national-
ism. Answers to this question are certainly quite interesting to understand the 
past and the present of societies. But for researches of security and interna-
tional relations, with their majority viewing the security policy as the sphere 
of subjective or inter-subjective perceptions21, the crucial point is that people 
trust in nation and national interests. This is the risk but at the same time 
the only realistic basis for ensuring security which a state and consequently, 
a national and human interest rest upon.
A special interconnection between a national and regional security and 
an ethnically-tinted nationalism is observed in Eastern Europe and post-So-
viet space22. From the Western standpoint, this interconnection can be per-
ceived as threat rather than security. Scholars or diplomats still witness on-
going ethnic conflicts there. However, as said above, ethically-tinted nation-
alism also contains a positive potential for ensuring security and the Eastern 
Europe/post-Soviet space, where only ethnic mythology convinces societies of the 
need in state/national independence, is an additional proof of this.
The West, be it NATO, the EU or bilateral donors, is taking efforts for 
the democratization and liberalization of mentioned societies. This necessar-
ily requires that the supremacy of law, developed civil society, pluralistic po-
litical society, effective bureaucracy and free economic society be built23. But 
whereas the issue of identity is of a secondary importance for those states that have 
a long experience in operating state institutions, it is the cornerstone of building 
statehood, i.e. democracy, for some, still frail post-communist countries. 
Geopolitical context of post-Communist, especially, post-Soviet coun-
tries adds to the international legitimacy and significance of their ethno-po-
litical identities. Internal, socio-cultural factor, which today works in favor 
of the independence of Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan or any other country, 
is ethnic beliefs, imaginations and myths. Advocacy for human rights alone 
cannot explain as to why it is impossible for, say, Georgians to build a com-
mon political future with Russians. But the existence of these new states and 
their independence from Russia is not just a whim of local politicians. It re-
flects interests of many international actors as well. Therefore, the increase 
in the attention to essential incentives for the independence of post-Soviet 
countries assumes international importance.
It requires a collective imagination and dreaming to maintain unity. In the 
long run, it is precisely the nationalism that is needed, with liberalism and democ-
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racy having a mission of preventing its extreme manifestations. Thus, in order to 
curb nationalism, which has become a cause of tragedy for many nations and con-
tributed to the demise of many states, and to build a consolidated democracy, the 
same nationalism should be supported.
This is a challenge. Assuming that nationalism is a threat and, at the 
same, a pillar of national, regional or international security, the choice faced 
by politicians becomes a dilemma. An example of the dilemma is not only 
and not limited to a possibility that the encouragement of nationalism may 
entail counter-nationalisms and conflicts with other countries or ethnic mi-
norities. The dilemma exists at the level of international law too and is ex-
pressed in the conflict between the principle of territorial integrity of states 
and the principle of nations’ self-determination. The solution cannot be uni-
versal, independent from time and space. It rather depends on a concrete sit-
uation, the maturity of states in question and their political elites. As Leah 
Greenfield notes, people are equal, whilst nations are not and the rights of 
nations assume starkly different significance in various circumstances24. Ac-
cording to Anthony Smith, a number of scholars the violence on the grounds 
of nationalism escalates when and if the state is weak25.
5. Prospects of the Georgian nation
The issue of the birth of the Georgian nation follows the logic and the 
dynamics of those attempts to explain the birth of a nation that were dis-
cussed above. The same holds true for the importance of the existence of the 
Georgian nation from the security policy standpoint. The attempt of con-
structivist explanation of the birth of the Georgian nation is associated with 
Ronald Suny’s name. As Suny notes, Georgian ethnic-cultural features ex-
isted for centuries but before being incorporated into Russia hardly anyone, 
except for a few nobles and clergymen, possessed a sense of their own na-
tionhood. Using a Marxist thesis about the origin of classes, Suny reckons 
that the Georgian nation was formed first “in itself ” (objective demograph-
ic existence) and than “for itself ” (organized-mobilized unity) at the end of 
19th century26. It is natural that such conclusions are seriously questioned by 
modern Georgian historians, in contrast to Georgian sociologists and politi-
cal scientists. But the problem again is what one calls a nation and how to 
differentiate it from ethnos or any pre-modern class society.
In political terms, as well as in terms of future prospects, more impor-
tant is the results of a sociological survey, conducted several years ago, which 
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suggest that the majority of the country’s population, both Georgians and ethnic 
minorities, identify themselves with ethnos rather than with citizenship27.
It was for the first time ever that, after the revolution in 2003, the presi-
dent of the country tailored his discourse to the idea of a super-ethnic, civic 
nation in such a way as not to deny popular ethno-nationalistic icons28. If the 
above said is complemented with systemic steps taken towards the introduc-
tion of critical reasoning in education instead of ideological-scholastic teach-
ing, these processes can be assessed as revolutionary-transformative. Yet, too 
little time has passed to talk about any success of an effective symbiosis of 
ethnic and civic identities. A very serious impediment to the victory of the 
concept of a civic nation, if such possible, is the reality that masses regard a 
quite influential Orthodox Christianity not only as an individual way of tran-
scendental revelation but also as a necessary attribute for Georgians.
Another issue is the infancy and consequently, the weakness of the 
Georgian state. By the year 2003, the Georgian political system, which had 
undergone civil and ethno-territorial conflicts, resembled, typologically, a ma-
fia-dominated state. The signs of this are the state’s inability to meet basic 
demands of the population and the mafia’s ability to operate its own mecha-
nism for protecting business and ordinary citizens. In 2004 the new authority 
started war against mafia. The war inevitably creates a real conflict between 
the imperatives of security, supremacy of the law and the protection of hu-
man rights. The situation further aggravates if the state lacks experience in 
using force in proportional and adequate manner.
Anticorruption measures undertaken in parallel with the fight against 
organized crime and efforts to optimize the state administration brought 
about “side effects” - the closure of customary sources of income for thou-
sands of people and the feeling of “offended dignity”. The latter was exacer-
bated by a revolutionary pace of reforms which led to the sacrifice of certain 
requirements for the so-called participatory democracy. A concrete imple-
menting mechanism for this requirement of a modern democracy, such as 
the cooperation of government bodies with a non-governmental sector, grew 
weaker. The relation between some government and media representatives 
worsened. As a result, an instinctive coalition against the government has 
been formed, which united and unites, among others, organizations special-
izing in human rights, representatives of arts and culture who, always used to 
be in favor, found themselves sidelined by the government, those who were 
suspicious about western values and adepts of the customs of former life. All 
this is complemented with such a classical problem of the national security as 
the violation of territorial integrity and tense relations with Russia. 
112
David Darchiashvili
Thus, when discussing future prospects of the Georgian nation, one 
should take into account internal, socio-political and cultural problems as 
well as foreign policy problems. Altogether they fall within the scope of the 
state and national security - the objective of the security policy is to protect 
basic interests of the so-called referent object, in this particular case, of a per-
son, nation and state29. The problems, mentioned above, are perceived by their 
“victims” as the violation of their basic interests. The failure to solve them, 
which does not at all mean satisfying personal ambitions of every individual, 
poses risk to Georgia’s statehood.
In order to build a modern nation and ensure its security, the Georgian 
government, in the nearest future, shall:
•	 Reach agreement on such a formulae of national identity 
that will strike a balance between ethnicity and citizenship 
that is acceptable for the majority of population. It 
should reflect the requirement for the allegiance to ethnic 
beliefs, religion and liberal-democratic principles;
•	 Effectively and vigorously continue the fight against national 
threats, but conduct it in a framework where human 
rights are observed and the rule of law strengthened; 
6. Conclusion
Answers to a question as to when a nation, or particularly, Georgian 
nation, was born will never be perfect. According to Ernest Renan, nation-
ality is a daily plebiscite. I think that some signs of nationality appeared at 
those times, when medieval narratives started discussing the importance of 
the Georgian language and mentioning “Georgia”. This does not mean that 
people living before those times on the territory of Georgia lacked a sense of 
collective identity. Nor does it mean that self-consciousness of Georgians in 
the epochs of King David or Queen Tamar was identical to that of the mod-
ern epoch. But the constructivism and ethno-symbolism represent the best 
guides for understanding our past and present. 
Nationality is an integral aspect of ensuring human, individual and, at 
the same time, state security. The proof of it is a collocation - National Secu-
rity - widely used in this crucial sphere of politics. 
Nationalism, especially ethnic and collectivistic, is dangerous. Most of 
current bloody conflicts are nourished, in this or that form, by nationalism. 
But there is no nationalism free of every element of ethic or cultural identity. 
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Whether the policy of ethnic purification becomes fully effective (as many ethno-
nationalists dangerously reason) “depends on many circumstances”.30
At present, many expressly ethnic nations try to master methods of civic na-
tionalism and enrich their culture with cultural features of minorities or impulses 
of globalization. Given a social-political environment and dominating percep-
tion in a number of post-Communist states, one should assume that even ethno-
nationalistic beliefs can be the basis to build up a liberal democracy. The latter is 
the only mean to ensure internal or external peace and stability. At the same time, 
the universe will remain a multiethnic puzzle in the foreseeable future. Under 
such circumstances one of general recommendations for building liberal democra-
cies is “to change a political culture, introduce legal and institutional innovations”. 
This should ensure “coexistence, shared security among various national and eth-
nic groups”31. The above said should make us think about strengthening the 
multi-national, regional identity and security, along with the national one. 
This, however, is the topic of a separate analysis.
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